The Origins of Private Social Insurance: Public Policy and Fringe Benefits in America, 1920-1950 by Dobbin, Frank
 
The Origins of Private Social Insurance: Public Policy and Fringe
Benefits in America, 1920-1950
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Dobbin, Frank R. 1992. The origins of private social insurance:
Public policy and fringe benefits in American, 1920-1950.
American Journal of Sociology 97, no. 5: 1416-1450.
Published Version doi:10.1086/229906
Accessed February 17, 2015 11:44:23 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3264874
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAAThe Origins of Private Social Insurance: Public Policy and Fringe Benefits in
America, 1920-1950
Frank R. Dobbin
The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 97, No. 5. (Mar., 1992), pp. 1416-1450.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9602%28199203%2997%3A5%3C1416%3ATOOPSI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C
The American Journal of Sociology is currently published by The University of Chicago Press.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained
prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in
the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/journals/ucpress.html.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For
more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
http://www.jstor.org
Wed Apr 11 11:44:41 2007The Origins of Private Social Insurance: 
Public Policy and Fringe Benefits in 
America, 1920-19501 
Frank R. Dobbin 
Princeton University 
How did the American system of  private, employment-related pen- 
sion and health insurance arise? Data on corporate fringe-benefit 
programs during the second quarter of the 20th century contradict 
the received wisdom that benefits rose in response to wartime fed- 
eral policy  changes and industrial factors. Instead it appears that 
public policies  such as the Wagner Act and Social Security led to 
union  and business support for  private insurance, which  in turn 
spurred the growth of  fringe benefits. The historical record suggests 
that neoinstitutional  and conflict approaches must be  synthesized 
to explain the expansion of  fringe benefits:  institutional factors in- 
fluenced organizational outcomes by affecting interest group goals. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past century the United States has developed an elaborate sys- 
tem  of  private,  employment-related  insurance  to  protect  Americans 
against income loss  due to illness and old age. Today over half  of  all 
full-time  employees  in  the  private  sector  are  covered  by  employer- 
provided  health insurance and pension  benefits (Rein 1982, p.  132). In 
1980, the private sector paid for 57% of  total U.S. health expenditures, 
an amount nearly 3.5 times greater than the average (17%) private-sector 
contribution  to  health  care  costs  among  Western  European  natiom2 
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my thoughts. Thanks to Edwin Amenta, Marvin Bressler, Daniel Cornfield, Ronald 
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The data on combined pension and health coverage includes only full-year nonfarm 
employees.  The countries for  which  comparative data were  available are Austria, 
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Likewise, the private sector provided 2 1% of total pension benefits in the 
United States, more than double the average private-sector contribution 
(9%) in Europe (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 85). In an effort to understand 
the origins of  America's  system of  employment-related  income  protec- 
tions, this article examines the decline of industrial welfare work and the 
rise of  corporate fringe-benefit programs in the second quarter of  the 20th 
century. 
Forms of  Employment-related Coverage 
Welfare  work.-Pension  and health  coverage  appeared  along  with 
other forms of  "welfare  work,"  such as company housing  and recre- 
ational programs, in the teens and twenties in firms like General Electric, 
U.S.  Steel,  Pullman, and International  Harvester.  Employer-financed 
welfare  programs were unsecured, and, because they were popularized 
as a means to increase worker loyalty, benefits were commonly denied 
to known union activists (Quadagno 1988, chap. 4). Employers paid for 
early  "informal"  pension  programs  from  current  income,  and mutual 
benefit  associations  maintained  contributory  employee-financed  funds 
that paid benefits  to injured and ill  employees and sometimes to their 
survivors (Brandes 1976). Such associations had been established as early 
as the 1860s in dangerous industries, and in the 1920s they became an 
integral part of  company welfare work. Like informal pension schemes, 
most mutual benefit associations could be terminated by the employer at 
will. While some employers used welfare work to fend off unions, others 
simply saw it as a way to maintain the work force. As one Midwestern 
businessman put it, "When I keep a horse and I find him a clean stable 
and good  food I am not  doing  anything philanthropic for  my horse" 
(Brandes 1976, p. 31). 
Health and pension insurance.-Between  the twenties and the fifties, 
firms installed health and pension insurance plans that put coverage on 
a  sound  actuarial  basis  and guaranteed  that benefits  would  be  paid. 
Group pension insurance was financed by joint employer-employee con- 
tributions to a private insurance company program, and benefits were 
usually calculated on the basis of  years of  service. Group accidentlsick- 
ness  insurance guaranteed  a  flat daily payment for  each day of  work 
missed  on account of  illness or injury-typically  two-thirds of  normal 
wages  (James  1947,  p.  263;  National  Industrial  Conference  Board 
[NICB] 1934, p.  13). In many settings this early form of  health coverage 
was later replaced or supplemented by medical and hospitalization cov- 
erage. American Journal of  Sociology 
Perspectives on Employment-related Coverage 
Industrial arguments.-A  number of  analysts have linked the rise of 
group insurance to industrial factors. First, some trace insurance schemes 
to efforts to quell turnover when competition for workers heated up in 
the late thirties  and forties-health  and pension  benefits based on job 
tenure were expected to discourage job  changes (see Slichter 1961). Sec- 
ond, labor segmentation theorists suggest that turnover was most costly 
in capital-intensive, core industries that relied on firm-specific skills, and 
that those industries increased wages and benefits to induce long-term 
employment (Doeringer and Piore  197 1; Hodson  1978; Edwards 1979, 
p.  142). In support of  this view Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982, pp. 
195-212)  find sectoral wage differences as early as 1914 and argue that 
today's labor-market segments and associated remuneration differences 
had crystallized by 1950. Third, others argue that union gains after the 
Wagner  Act  stimulated  the  growth  of  fringe  benefits,  either  because 
unions sought new victories in contract negotiations or because employers 
voluntarily adopted fringe benefits to thwart organizing efforts (Bernstein 
1972; Jacoby  1985). Finally, organizational  theorists have argued that 
growth in firm size leads to the formalization of  employment relations 
(Blau and Schoenherr 1971; Pugh et al. 1969), and analysts indeed date 
the rise  of  formal, insured types of  health and pension  coverage to the 
war years,  when  firms grew dramatically in  size.  Arguments broadly 
similar to these have been  made about the rise  and decline of  welfare 
work. Analysts suggest that welfare work rose in response to union activ- 
ism in the twenties and declined in the early thirties when the Depression 
undermined union power and dampened labor turnover (Brandes 1976; 
Brody 1980). 
Public policy arguments.-Others  have tied the rise of  private insur- 
ance to the broad public policy stance of the United States and to specific 
laws and policies. Jill  Quadagno (1984,  1988) links the rise  of  private 
pensions to the weakness of  public protections and to the persisting politi- 
cal  power  of  industrialists who  opposed  social  insurance.  Paul  Starr 
(1982) suggests that the growth of  private health insurance was contin- 
gent on the failure of a series of public health insurance bills in the early 
forties. 
More specifically it has been  argued, as early as 1953 by Louise Ilse 
and as recently  as  1988 by Jill  Quadagno  and by  Beth  Stevens, that 
particular  wartime  federal  policies  provided  the  decisive  push  to 
employment-related  health and pension  insurance.  The wartime rise in 
fringe benefits is thought to be the result of  the confluence of  three poli- 
cies: the excess-profits tax, the wage freeze, and the tax-exempt status of Private Social Insurance 
pension  and health  insurance payments.  That is, the wartime  excess-
profits tax spurred firms to increase their before-tax  expenditures,  and 
increased labor turnover encouraged  them to do so by raising wages. 
However, the wage freeze stymied them. Caught in a bind between the 
excess-profits  tax and the wage  freeze, employers gained  relief  in  the 
form of  federal rulings that employer payments for pension  and health 
insurance were not covered by the wage freeze and were tax-deductible 
(Munts 1967; Macaulay 1959). The huge increases in health and pension 
insurance during the early forties are attributed by many to this set of 
circumstances, which purportedly caused employers to install or expand 
fringe-benefit packages in lieu of  increasing wages. 
The empirical sections below look at welfare work and insurance prac- 
tices in the early years of  the Depression, in the last half of  the thirties, 
and during World War 11.  Industrial arguments receive little support in 
the data on the Depression years, because both welfare work and insur- 
ance rose during the early 1930s when all of  the industrial factors associ- 
ated with a tight labor market were mitigated by the economic collapse. 
Moreover, interindustry data from the forties suggest that industrial fac- 
tors cannot explain wartime increases in insurance coverage. Public pol- 
icy arguments also receive  little support, because the wartime rises  in 
health and pension  benefits preceded  the war-related  wage freeze and 
excess-profits tax. 
Institutional context and interest group goals.-I  develop an alterna- 
tive argument that draws on insights from neoinstitutional organizational 
theory and institutional theories of public policy, but which fills an impor- 
tant gap in those theories. These perspectives point to the ways in which 
institutional structures constrain the policy choices made by organizations 
and by nation-states. At the organizational level, practices and structures 
become institutionalized in the environment-often  in response to public 
policy  inducements-and  then diffuse  across all  sorts of  organizations 
(Meyer and Rowan 1978; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Tolbert and Zucker 
1983). In the process  of  institutionalization,  practices are socially con- 
structed as rational and enter the body of  accepted corporate practice. 
For the most  part, organizational  theorists  have neglected  the role  of 
interest groups in promoting salient public policies at the political level, 
and in helping to institutionalize certain organizational practices (Perrow 
1986;  DiMaggio  and  Powell  1991).  Some  notable  exceptions  include 
Fligstein's  (1990) work linking federal antitrust policies  to the goals of 
corporate managers and, in turn, to corporate strategy, and Baron, Dob- 
bin, and  Jennings's (1986) work linking wartime federal controls on labor 
turnover to the goals of personnel professionals and, in turn, to changing 
personnel practices. This study extends this line of research by examining American Journal of  Sociology 
how public policy shifts changed the organizational and political goals of 
salient interest groups, and how those  altered goals in turn stimulated 
the growth of  fringe benefits. 
The new institutionalism in political science has, unfortunately, helped 
to validate organizational studies that neglect conflict, because as a po- 
lemic against the conflict approach to policy-making it has deemphasized 
interest group behavior (Krasner 1984; Zysman 1983; Skowronek 1982). 
Some have examined how institutions offer differential resources to dif- 
ferent groups (Weir and Skocpol 1983), but few have examined the larger 
question of how institutional context shapes group goals in the first place 
and even  determines what kinds of  groups  will  emerge (but see  Hall 
1986). The evidence presented below suggests that institutional theorists 
should treat group behavior as an intermediate variable between institu- 
tional  context  and organizational  and political  choices.  If  the goals of 
interest groups such as unions vary considerably across time and space, 
and they do, then institutionalists  should be  examining the contextual 
factors that influence those goals. 
In the case of fringe benefits, by tracing the effects of  public policy on 
labor and business group preferences and on the insurance industry, we 
can understand why those groups pursued particular goals at particular 
points in time.  The prevalence of  fringe-benefit  programs increased in 
the second quarter of  this century largely because  public policy created 
incentives that caused each of these groups to promote health and pension 
coverage in organizations. This approach highlights a central weakness 
in the conflict approach, namely the premise  that interest groups have 
predictable,  time-invariant  goals.  In  fact,  union  and  business  goals 
switched back and forth between employer-provided insurance and social 
insurance as public policy  changed. The approach outlined here brings 
the insights of institutional theory and conflict theory together. 
How did public policy influence the goals of business and labor groups? 
First,  the  combination of  early industrial development  and late  state 
development left  the United  States with a  large number  of  industrial 
workers in  the last quarter of  the  19th century and with a  state that 
showed no signs of being able to provide them with social insurance. To 
fill  the gap, benevolent  societies (later unions) appeared in  dangerous 
industries such as railroads and mining; firms installed their own informal 
protections  for  workers; and a  private life insurance  industry arose to 
protect families against destitution in the event of  the death of  the bread- 
winner (Zelizer 1979). These private forms of  coverage would have last- 
ing effects. First of  all, the United States developed a strong insurance 
industry that would promote private insurance and would lobby against 
public coverage.  Second, American  Federation of  Labor (AFL) leader- 
ship came to believe that unions' benevolent functions increased member Private Social Insurance 
loyalty, thus they supported private forms of  coverage until about 1932. 
Then, after the  passage  of  the  Social Security Act in  1935, case  law 
surrounding the Wagner Act caused unions to spend their energies fight- 
ing for the right to bargain over fringe benefits, which turned them into 
supporters of  private coverage during the late thirties and forties. Third, 
some business leaders supported social insurance in the teens, but in the 
absence of  public  protections the business  community at large became 
wedded to employer-provided  insurance by  about  1920; they too  had 
come to believe that it helped them win worker loyalty. After the owners 
of  some  center  firms  supported  Social  Security in  the midthirties, the 
majority of  capitalists backed employer-provided benefits during the for- 
ties, as part of  the fight with unions to keep fringe benefits off the bar- 
gaining table. After public policy came to favor unions in benefit negotia- 
tions, business leaders led a successful fight for the expansion  of  Social 
Security benefits in the early fifties. Public policy context, then, shaped 
the  changing goals  of  these  groups, and in  the  process it contributed 
to the rise of  private fringe-benefit  programs. Moreover, public policies 
frequently  had  unintended  effects, as when  Social  Security legislation 
effected increases in the popularity of  private pensions. 
THE DATA 
This article tries to sort out the origins of  employment-related pension 
and health insurance by examining interindustry data that were collected 
by the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB)  between 1928 and 
1946. The data facilitate interindustry and over-time comparisons that 
make it possible to evaluate competing theories of  the rise of  insurance. 
The NICB is a business association that conducts studies of  current busi- 
ness practices. It carried out extensive industrial surveys in 1928, 1935, 
1939, and 1946 that included questions about informal pensions, mutual 
benefit  associations,  pension  insurance,  and health  insurance  (NICB 
1929, 1936, 1940a, 1947). 
The NICB's industrial relations surveys contain the best data available 
on  the  prevalence  of  early  corporate fringe-benefit  programs.  Earlier 
studies that employed these  surveys to  chart the growth of  personnel 
administration and internal labor markets have identified several advan- 
tages (Baron et al.  1986; Baron, Jennings,  and Dobbin  1988). First, the 
surveys  contain data on thousands  of  publicly  held  firms  from  every 
region of  the country and every industrial sector, and they cover a crucial 
period of  nearly 20 years. In the words of  the NICB, "The Conference 
Board's compilation has remained the only survey of  nationwide scope, 
embracing a wide range of  practices, and presenting information in de- 
tail" (NICB 1954, p.  1). The board's  1928 survey included 6,085 firms; American Journal of  Sociology 
the 1935 survey included 2,452 firms with a total of 4.5 million workers, 
or 15.5% of  the national labor force in covered industries (NICB 1936, 
p.  5); the  1939 survey included  2,700 firms  with  a  total  of  5 million 
employees (NICB 1939); and the 1946 survey covered 3,498 firms with 
an unreported number of  employees (NICB 1947).~  Second, the surveys 
are comparable over time because the NICB used consistent survey tech- 
niques.  It compiled  a  list  of  firms from  the  publications  of  Dun and 
Bradstreet, the New York Stock Exchange, and Standard and Poor, and 
sent surveys to all firms on the list.4  But in 1928 it was decided to extend 
"the study in order to develop the picture of  industrial relations activities 
in . . . smaller establishments by oversampling firms with fewer than 250 
employees" (NICB 1929, p. v). The 1928 sample includes roughly four 
times as many small firms as the later samples, and because there is no 
record of  how the NICB increased the participation of  small firms it is 
not prudent to think of  the figures for small firms in 1928 as comparable 
with those for later years. 
With the exception of  the extra group of small firms in the 1928 survey, 
it appears that many of  the same firms participated in each survey be- 
cause NICB affiliates regularly took part in its studies (NICB 1954) and 
because the board used  the same procedures to contact firms for each 
survey. Characteristics of  the data also suggest comparability. Average 
firm  size  increased  less  than  1% between  the  1935 and 1939 surveys, 
although  average  employment was  not  published  in the  1946 report. 
Moreover the proportion  of  firms in each industrial category was quite 
stable over time, and the total number of large firms was stable over the 
first three waves, which suggests that many firms participated in every 
survey. 
A  third  advantage is  that, for  the last  three  panels,  the published 
reports provide data on some 25 detailed industry categories. This facili- 
tates interindustry and over-time comparisons. 
The board's  reports also have several disadvantages. First, for  1928, 
industry-level data were reported only for small firms and only for  10 
broad  industry categories,  thus  meaningful  interindustry comparisons 
While the number of  firms with fewer than 250 employees was virtually the same 
in  1939 and 1946 (861 and 867, respectively)  there is a substantial  increase  in  the 
number of  large firms. It is likely that more firms fitting the NICB survey profile 
responded  in  this year  because  there  was  a  great  deal of  interest  in  the  changes 
in  personnel practices  wrought by  the  war  economy. Many of  the NICB's  regular 
respondents grew dramatically in size during the war, which probably explains the 
disproportionate  increase in responses from large firms. 
E. Kay Worrell, Survey Research Center Manager at the NICB, kindly looked into 
the survey procedures  used in  the early NICB personnel studies and provided me 
with this information. Private Social Insurance 
cannot be made between  1928 and later years.'  Second, the reports cer- 
tainly exaggerate the prevalence of  fringe benefits in the American econ- 
omy  because  the  surveys  were  biased  toward  large  publicly  held 
firms-mean  firm size was 1,836 and 1,847 employees in 1935 and 1939, 
respectively.  Yet the  board  saw this  size  bias  as an asset,  for  "large 
companies  frequently  are leaders  in  inaugurating  techniques"  (NICB 
1954, p. 2). Likewise for the present purposes, the size bias may be seen 
as an asset because it highlights industry-level trends. A third disadvan- 
tage is  that firms were  not  asked how many of  their employees  were 
eligible for benefit programs, and we know from the 1946 tables (NICB 
1947) that a number of firms offered pensions only to managers. In short, 
while the surveys surely magnify the aggregate use of  pension and health 
benefits in American firms, they do reflect what was going on in large 
firms in each sector and they have the asset of  over-time comparability. 
THE EARLY DEPRESSION 
Welfare Work 
What caused employers to install welfare practices, which served as prec- 
edents for insurance, and what caused them to abandon welfare practices 
and open the way for insured benefits? Unfortunately, the NICB data 
pick up welfare work in the middle of  its life cycle, which makes sorting 
out causes somewhat problematic; however, industries that are outliers in 
the 1935 survey do provide some useful insights about industrial causes6 
The industries that show exceptionally  high  scores on both  informal 
pensions and mutual benefit associations are the utilities (gas and electric- 
ity) and trade (see table 1). First, the utilities were both capital and skill 
intensive,  but only  a sixth of  the firms  surveyed were  unionized.  The 
other blue-collar  nonmanufacturing industries-transportation1commu-
nication  and  mining-were  likewise  capital  and  skill  intensive  and 
shared high scores on welfarism,  but they were highly unionized  (50% 
of  the capital-intensive firms and 57% of  the skill-intensive firms were 
unionized; see NICB 1936). This suggests that early welfare work was 
driven by efforts to retain skilled employees in capital-intensive sectors 
rather than by unionism  per se. Table 2, which reports every pension 
program that the NICB could locate in 1925 by industry, confirms this: 
While the NICB surveyed thousands of  organizations, they only reported industry- 
level figures and they disposed of the original questionnaires. 
Because the  1928 study reported interindustry data only for small firms, the 1935 
data give a better picture of differences across industries. Note that the marginals for 
large firms changed little between these two panels, which suggests that most growth 
had occurred by  1928 and that the decline of  these practices had not yet begun. TABLE 1 
PREVALENCE  AND YEAR(%) OF BENEFITS BY INDUSTRY 
INFORMAL OR INDIVIDUAL 
PENSIONS  MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS  GROUP PENSIONS  HEALTH/ACCIDENT INSURANCE 
1928  1935  1939  1946  1928  1935  1939  1946  1928  1935  1939  1946  1928  1935  1939  1946 
Agricultural implements 
Automobiles and parts 
Aircraft and parts 
. 
.  .  . 
. 




Food products  . 

Leather and its products  . 

Lumber and ~ts  products 

Building materials and supplles  . 

Machines and machine tools 

Metals and metal products  . 

Paper and its products  .  . 

Petroleum and its products 

Printing and pubhshlng 

Rubber  .  . 

Stone, clay, and glass 

Glass  .  . 

Textiles and clothlng  . 

Manufacturing industries  . 

Banking  .  .  . 

Insurance  .  .  . 

Gas and electricity 

Transportation and communication 

Transportation  . 

Communication and broadcasting 

Wholesale and retall trade  .  . 

Mining  . 





All industries (firms with fewer 
than 250 employees) 
All industries (firms with 250 
or more employees) 
NOTE.-Industry-specific  and sectoral data for 1928 pertain only to firms with 250 or fewer employees. Several industries have been collapsed to facilitate comparisons 
over  time: textiles and clothing are combined;  "chemicals" includes drugs,  dyes,  paints,  pigments,  varnishes,  soap,  and  toilet preparations; and "metals  and metal 
products" includes iron and steel and nonmachine metal products. For some other industries that could not be  collapsed to match  over time,  percentages are reported 
within parentheses that span several categories in problematic years (e.g., transportation, communication, and broadcasting).  Marginals by  sector and size include some 
industrial categories not listed here. Private Social Insurance 
TABLE 2 

NUMBER OF PENSION PLANS IN OPERATION  BY INDUSTRY,  1925 

CONTRIBUTORY  Limited 
(INSURED)  Discretionary  Contractual  TOTAL 
Chemicals  ................... 
Food ......................  .... 
Metals ........................ 
Paper and printing  ........ 
Petroleum  ................... 
Textiles  ...................... 
Miscellaneous  .............. 
Banking  ..................... 
.................... Insurance 
Mining  ....................... 
Railroads  .................... 
Trade  ........................ 
Utilities  ...................... 
Total  ................... 
SOURCE: NICB (1925, p.  15) 
informal pensions were common in the highly unionized railway industry, 
but they were also common in the largely nonunion metals and utilities 
sectors (Wolman 1936). The relationship that some have found between 
unionism and welfare practices, then, may be spurious. Industries that 
were  both  capital and skill intensive  could  ill  afford labor discontent, 
which made it difficult for them to fight unions and also spurred them 
to install welfare practices to placate workers. 
Retail and wholesale firms were the most likely to use  both welfare 
practices. Carter and Carter (1985, p. 590) suggest that large retail stores 
adopted welfare work practices because  their profitability  depended on 
presenting  an affable, clean,  and healthy face  to the public  (see also 
Nelson  1975; Labor  Statistics Bureau  1917). By offering  pension  and 
health coverage,  firms kept ill and superannuated employees at home. 
At  first  glance that thesis  seems to be  challenged by  the fact that in 
white-collar banking and insurance firms, which likewise depended on 
customer relations, informal pension plans were rare and mutual benefit 
associations were unheard of. Table 1 shows that those industries used 
formal  pension  insurance instead of  informal  pensions, yet  for health 
insurance, banks reported the lowest use of  any industry and the insur- 
ance industry itself  reported only  average use.  Why did banking  and 
insurance differ from trade in their use of health coverage? Contemporary American Journal of  Sociology 
studies found that, instead of  offering health coverage, some one-half to 
two-thirds of  banks and insurance companies guaranteed salary mainte- 
nance  for  injured or ill  workers, but this practice was unworkable in 
wage-based industries where the time clock reigned (Baker 1940; NICB 
1937). 
Most  analysts date the decline  of  welfare  work  to  the  Depression, 
arguing that once problems  of  turnover  and union  activism  subsided, 
employers could ill  afford to be  charitable, and that Roosevelt's  hard- 
line stance against industrial paternalism discouraged welfarism (Brandes 
1976; Brody 1980; Achenbaum  1986). Yet figure 1 shows no decline; on 
the contrary, both practices showed small increases  among large firms 
(see table  1 above). Moreover, the 1935 study reports that only 4%  of 
those firms that had used informal pensions had discontinued them and 
only 8% of  those that had used mutual benefit associations had discon- 
tinued those (NICB 1936, p. 11; see also Parks 1936). Some health and 
pension welfare programs may have expired when firms went bankrupt 
and closed their doors, but few of  the firms that endured canceled their 
programs. The 1939 figures show that, even after the Wagner Act had 
expanded union membership, firms did not abandon welfare practices. 
Why, then, do analysts date the end of welfare practices to the Depres- 
sion or to the Wagner Act? Sanford Jacoby (1984, p. 41) suggests that it 
is  because  paternalistic "old  welfare  work"  practices  such  as housing 
programs,  thrift plans  (e.g., stock purchase programs through payroll 
deductions), recreational programs, and educational programs were dis- 
continued,  but  "new  welfare  work"  practices,  which  tied  benefits  to 
loyalty  and job  tenure (e.g., pensions and mutual benefit associations) 
actually grew. Indeed, the NICB found that among large firms home 
purchase plans declined by 48% between 1928 and 1935, company hous- 
ing programs dropped by  28%,  and stock purchase plans fell by 56% 
(NICB 1929, 1936). But firms did not cancel health and pension  forms 
of  welfare work. 
In sum, the argument that employers installed pension and health care 
forms of welfarism to quell turnover among skilled employees receives 
some support in the NICB data. Yet the evidence for arguments about 
labor turnover and union busting is mixed, because firms did not aban- 
don these forms of  welfarism either in the early thirties when labor turn- 
over was no longer a problem, or in the late thirties after their employees 
had joined unions. 
Health and Pension Insurance 
The prevalence of employment-related  health and pension insurance in- 
creased  significantly  between  1928 and 1935 (see table  1 and fig.  1). Private Social Insurance 
Year 
FIG.1.-Pension  and health benefits among large firms,  1928-46 
Among the large firms surveyed, healthlaccident insurance more than 
doubled, from 16% to 34%, and group pension  plans rose from under 
2 % to over 13%. In addition, existing pension and health insurance pro- 
grams were seldom abandoned despite the unsteady economy. In its 1935 
study the NICB found that only 7% of  all pension and health insurance 
programs had been  canceled since the onset of  the Depression  (NICB 
1936, p.  11; see  also  Parks  1936). These trends belie  every industrial 
explanation of  the origins of insurance, because the Depression mitigated 
the problems  associated with turnover, union  activism, organizational 
growth,  and labor-market segmentation.  However,  public  policy  had 
marked effects on the aims of  the insurance industry, labor unions, and 
business groups, all of whom successfully promoted private insurance at 
the organizational level and provided weak support for social insurance. 
Public Policy and Interest Group Goals 
Three important groups promoted private health and pension insurance 
during the  twenties  and early  thirties;  their  support  can  be  traced, 
broadly, to institutional context and, in a more specific sense, to public 
policy.  The industrial  revolution  brought  huge  firms  and enormous 
unions to the United States in the latter decades of  the 19th century, but 
the American  state remained singularly weak and disorganized. It was American Journal of  Sociology 
clear that the state would be unwilling, and unable, to provide adequate 
social insurance coverage for industrial workers, and unions and busi- 
nesses soon stepped in to fill the gap by providing coverage of  their own. 
American  Express introduced pension  coverage in  1875, and by  1925 
over 200 large firms were offering pensions (NICB 1925, 1929; National 
Personnel Association 1922, p. 6). Health and accident coverage was first 
offered  in the dangerous mining  and railway  industries  by  benevolent 
societies that soon  evolved  into unions  (Brandes  1976). Business and 
labor groups that had developed their own forms of  insurance opposed 
social insurance, such as the state health programs advocated by Progres- 
sive reformers in the 1910s, so that by the mid-thirties only private health 
and pension  coverage existed (Anderson 1985, pp. 66-73).  Meanwhile, 
in the 1800s a large life insurance industry, which surpassed European 
insurance industries in size and sophistication, grew up alongside new 
industrial enterprises with the encouragement of state legislatures (Zelizer 
1979). By the early 1930s, their experiences with private insurance turned 
insurers, unions, and business leaders into effective supporters of  private 
coverage. 
The insurance industry strategy.-The  presence of  a large insurance 
industry, with sophisticated actuarial techniques, that was poised to ex- 
pand insurance coverage during the Depression contributed to the growth 
of  private health and pension insurance. The Depression  proved to be 
an unexpected boon to the insurance industry, whose assets increased by 
one-third between  1929 and 1935, in part because of  the increased eco- 
nomic insecurity during that period (James  1947, p.  293). While large 
insurers saw declines in their commercial business, they also saw substan- 
tial increases in  group insurance plans for employees.  The number of 
companies writing health and accident insurance rose by 20% between 
1929 and 1931 alone (Insurance Almanac 1930, p. 1189; 1932, p. 1016). 
For 193  1, the eight largest group insurers reported that one-third of  their 
premium income came from group insurance other than life insurance, 
such as health and pension insurance, compared with only 1% from this 
source in 1926 (Bureau of  Labor Statistics 1932-43  [1932, p. 531). 
The increasing popularity of income-protection insurance was partly a 
result of the new sales strategies insurers adopted during the Depression. 
Insurers encouraged salesmen to cast health and accident  coverage as 
"income insurance" that would guard families against destitution (Tiger 
1932, p.  11; Landers  1935, p.  13). In response  to a  250%  increase in 
disability  claims  against life  policies  during the early  Depression,  the 
major insurance firms separated life and disability coverage and began 
offering these popular forms of  coverage in low-cost package deals that 
included pension and health coverage as well (NICB 1934, p. 36; Bureau Private Social Insurance 
of  Labor Statistics 1932-43  [1933, p. 541; Stone 1957, p. 154). Insurance 
companies also encouraged employers to sustain coverage for employees 
by  (a) using  "work  sharing" instead of  layoffs,  which  helped  to keep 
employees on the insurance rolls, and (b) continuing to pay premiums 
during temporary plant shutdowns to prevent policy cancellation (Bureau 
of  Labor Statistics 1932-43  [1933, p. 531). Among insurers, industry pub- 
lications encouraged firms to try to replace their lost commercial business 
with these forms of  coverage.  By  1935 an industry trade journal  sug- 
gested that a "'well  balanced' agency should have at least a third of  its 
casualty premiums in the health and accident line" (Rough Notes  1935, 
p.  11). 
While they were promoting private insurance at the firm level, insur- 
ance industry leaders were lobbying Congress for Social Security legisla- 
tion that would favor the industry. They promoted an amendment that 
would  exempt employers with  private  insurance  schemes from  Social 
Security taxes, with the goal of shaping legislation that would cause most 
employers to adopt private insurance. H. Walters Forster, a partner in 
a Philadelphia agency specializing in group annuity coverage, organized 
a massive campaign among insurance industry executives and employers 
in support of  this amendment, but President Roosevelt insisted on public 
coverage, and in the Senate committee the final vote was a tie, which 
kept the amendment out of the act (Witte 1962, p. 161). 
Union  goals.-On  the other  hand, AFL leadership,  under  Samuel 
Gompers, favored private benefits programs consistently until 1932, even 
though some AFL locals had come to support social insurance instead. 
Gompers's  position  can  be  traced  to  two factors.  First,  he  preferred 
union-provided insurance because he believed that union health benefits 
won members. His own union career had begun with the cigar makers 
in New York, where he proposed union sickness and death benefits in 
the late 1870s and saw a tenfold increase in membership (Starr 1982, p. 
249).  Railway  unions,  which  had  their  roots  in  benevolent  societies 
formed  to protect members  against calamity, shared Gompers's  senti- 
ments. Of course, those union benefit programs had appeared in the first 
place to make up for the absence of  public social insurance. 
Second, Gompers and other AFL leaders were suspicious of  proposals 
for public coverage because federal policy in the teens and twenties had 
been so firmly antiunion. Thus in 1916 Gompers not only failed to lobby 
for social insurance legislation, he testified against it before the House 
Committee on Labor (Anderson 1985). The legacy of early union benefit 
programs and the federal government's antiunion stance was an Ameri- 
can union movement led by men who opposed social insurance and fa- 
vored private protection (Achenbaum 1986, p. 84; Witte 1962). American Journal of  Sociology 
Business preferences.-Business  leaders had briefly  advocated social 
insurance in  the teens,  but they soon  switched  their support back  to 
private coverage. European business leaders in skilled, highly paid indus- 
tries often supported social insurance because it shifted responsibility for 
coverage to the state, so it is somewhat surprising that their American 
counterparts largely backed private coverage. 
The record  suggests that high-wage employers backed private insur- 
ance schemes for the same reason Gompers did; they believed they had 
won  worker  allegiance  by  offering benefits  (Quadagno  1984, p. 636). 
Firms at the forefront of  welfare capitalism,  such as Western  Electric, 
had first installed welfare programs to win the hearts and minds of em- 
ployees and had apparently achieved success. Consequently, such busi- 
ness  organizations  as the National  Association  of  Manufacturers,  the 
Chamber of  Commerce, and the National  Civic Federation withdrew 
their support for public health coverage during the teens when members 
argued that employer-provided  coverage served important labor control 
functions (Starr 1982, pp. 250-52;  Anderson 1985, p. 86). That was the 
turning point for business support of  state health insurance. In the 1920s, 
business associations (NICB 1925) and government agencies (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics  1928) promoted the idea that fringe benefits could  in- 
crease  productivity  and  help  control  labor  dissent  (Berkowitz  and 
McQuaid 1980, pp. 82-84). 
In the 1920s, industrial relations professionals, echoing welfare capital- 
ists, argued that health insurance was an effective antiunion device be- 
cause it demonstrated  the goodwill of  the employer and circumvented 
the union bargaining process. Auto industry firms, for instance, had in- 
troduced health  coverage to undermine the efforts of  the United Auto 
Workers, an organization adamantly opposed to unilateral fringe-benefit 
programs because they interfered  with the union's  role  of  representing 
the workers  (Munts  1967, p.  9).  General  Motors introduced a  group 
health insurance plan in 1926, finding that when unions objected to the 
plan they alienated prospective members (Munts 1967, p. 48). This strat- 
egy of  using benefits to quell unionism was widely promoted in the con- 
temporary literature on union avoidance. Accordingly, in table 1 we find 
that industries that faced  the  most  active union  organizing  efforts- 
autos, paper, and rubber-show  remarkable rates of  private health cov- 
erage (NICB 1940a; Pelling 1960). As early as 1928, the paper and rubber 
industries reported  unusually high  rates of  health  insurance  coverage, 
and by  1935 autos, paper, and rubber reported  rates that were nearly 
double the average and at  least 13 percentage points higher than the next 
highest manufacturing industry (see table 1). 
Recent policy  shif,ts and business preferences.-Three  contemporary Private Social Insurance 
policy  changes encouraged firms to  adopt private  health  and pension 
insurance. First, tax code changes in 1926 made corporate contributions 
to insured pensions deductible, and after the corporate tax increases of 
the  early  thirties  this  made  insured  pensions  increasingly  attractive 
(Schieber 1982; Stevens 1988). Indeed, between  1925 and 1935, insured 
pensions rose from 11% to 30% of  all pensions (NICB 1925, 1936). Sec- 
ond, Roosevelt's New Dealers tried to put an end to welfare work first 
by  prohibiting  employers  from  requiring  participation  in  "company 
unions," which were at the core of  welfarism, in the National Industrial 
Recovery Act of  1932, and then by  outlawing "company unions"  alto- 
gether in the Wagner Act of July 1935 (Schlesinger 1958). Stuart Brandes 
argues that, on top of  the economic exigencies of  the Depression, this 
attack on  company unions  brought down "the whole array of  welfare 
practices"  (1976, p.  144). While we know that welfare  work survived 
the early thirties, the antiwelfare stance of the New Dealers undoubtedly 
encouraged employers to choose health and pension insurance over un- 
insured plans (see fig.  1). In addition, the banking and insurance indus- 
tries  faced  special  federal  incentives  during  these  years.  Expanded 
Depression-era regulation of  financial institutions through the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora- 
tion made banks and insurance companies accountable for their outlays. 
Because firms had difficulty justifying to federal regulators their infor- 
mal, discretionary pension payments, many switched to insured pension 
schemes (Schlesinger  1958; Romasco  1983). Thus by  1935, 38%  of  all 
banks  and 46%  of  all  insurance companies  reported  offering  pension 
insurance (NICB 1936). These are among the highest rates of  use for the 
time. Health insurance plans doubtless remained  rare in those sectors 
because  of  the practice of  salary continuation, which did not raise the 
eyebrows of  auditors. 
In sum, Depression-era industrial conditions do not seem to have put 
an end to welfare work or retarded the growth of  employment-related 
insurance. Instead, American  public  policy,  specifically  the paucity  of 
public income protections, had created a sophisticated insurance indus- 
try, ready to promote income-loss insurance during the Depression, and 
had led business and labor leaders to develop their own private forms of 
illness  and pension  coverage.  Privately  organized  insurance  schemes 
gained constituencies among union and business leaders, as Philip Selz- 
nick (1948) would predict, and those leaders came to prefer private forms 
of  coverage to public forms in the twenties and early thirties.  Finally, 
specific public policies encouraged firms to adopt insured benefits and to 
abandon informal  benefit programs. As  a result private insurance rose 
during the early years of the Depression. American Journal of  Sociology 
THE LATE THIRTIES 
The Social Security Act 
Policy  analysts  anticipated  that Social  Security and the  Wagner  Act 
would have marked effects on employment-related insurance. Social Se- 
curity was expected to render private pension insurance obsolete, at  least 
for nonmanagerial employees. By contrast, the Wagner Act led to a rise 
in  unionism  that was expected to result  in  the growth of  all  sorts of 
employment benefits (NICB 1936, 1940~).  Yet table 1 shows almost no 
change in the aggregate figures for health and pension insurance between 
1935 and 1939. Was insurance really stagnant over these years? A closer 
examination of  the data illuminates some unanticipated consequences of 
the Social Security Act. The section on the war years, below, deals with 
the specific effects of the Wagner Act. 
The NICB surveyed several hundred firms in  1939 to ascertain the 
effects of Social Security legislation on private pension schemes. It found 
that less than one-tenth of  those offering private pensions in  1935 had 
canceled them  by  1939. "This  delay in making necessary  adjustments 
may  be  explained  by  the  constant  agitation  for  certain  fundamental 
changes in the law which began almost as soon as it became effective" 
(NICB 1939, p. 24). Roosevelt argued for the expansion of  the Social 
Security Act while his opponents tried to get it declared unconstitutional 
in the courts; firms waited to see who would prevail. 
However, the NICB data suggest that, in high-wage industries, the 
low Social Security benefit levels caused substantial numbers of firms to 
purchase private supplementary insurance without delay. The maximum 
benefits to be paid out by the old-age insurance program of  Social Secu- 
rity were set below the minimum wage and were compressed. An  em- 
ployee who was earning $100 a month and who was fully vested would 
receive $35 a month upon retirement, or 35% of  her regular wages. Yet 
an employee earning $250 a month would receive only $56 a month upon 
retirement, or 22% of  her regular wages. Because benefits  were limited 
to the first $3,000 of  wages, an employee earning $5,000 annually would 
also receive $56 monthly, or 13% of  her regular pay (Ilse 1953, p. 297). 
Consequently, the NICB data show the greatest percentage gains in the 
use of  insured pensions in industries with highly paid employees (Bureau 
of  Economic Analysis  1986; NICB 1939). In the manufacturing sector, 
chemicals,  electrical  manufacturing,  petroleum,  and printing  saw the 
greatest  percentage  increases  in  group  pensions  between  1935  and 
1939~-gains  of  at least 40%. According to the 1940 census, these four 
' This is true with the exception of  three industries that saw large percentage increases 
because less than 3% of  firms had pensions in 1935. Private Social Insurance 
industries had at least twice as many professional and semiprofessional 
workers (8.6%- 10.2  %) as other manufacturing industries (0.6%-3.8%), 
with the exception of  machines (10.2%; Bureau of  the Census 1940).~ 
These industries also reported wages that were 25%-45%  above the na- 
tional average in 1939 (Bureau of  Economic Analysis 1986, p. 279). Many 
firms had held off  adopting private pension  schemes because  they had 
anticipated federal coverage, but the passage of this weak public cover- 
age  evidently  convinced  those  in  high-wage  sectors  to wait  no  longer 
(NICB 1939; Ilse 1953). The effects of  weak Social Security coverage can 
also be seen among banks, whose employees were excluded in the 1935 
legislation.  As a result, we see in table 1 that private pension  coverage 
in banking increased  14 percentage  points between  1935 and 1939. In 
short, in  sectors where  the  Social  Security Act  provided  the weakest 
pension  coverage, passage  spurred firms  to adopt private  plans.  The 
architects of  Social Security legislation had not anticipated that outcome. 
By 1939 the act had caused twice as many firms to install private pension 
programs as to cancel existing plans (NICB 1939, p. 24). Helen Baker, 
of  Princeton's  Industrial  Relations  Section, wrote  in  1940 that the act 
had "encouraged rather than retarded voluntary action [private pension 
coverage] by the employer" (1940, p.  10). 
The act also caused two-thirds of the firms that offered pension insur- 
ance in 1935 to replace it with supplemental insurance designed to dove- 
tail with public  coverage by  1939 (NICB 1939). Most of  the new pro- 
grams (66%) were graduated, so that private pension coverage increased 
with income as a function of the decline in public coverage, which meant 
that employees would receive  total retirement benefits equivalent to  a 
flat percentage of  their working income (NICB 1940b). 
Social  Security legislation  also  spurred firms  with  informal  pension 
plans to update them, and in the process many switched to the contempo- 
rary insured (and tax-deductible) form of  pension coverage. The NICB 
found that one-fourth  of  firms that used the old-style self-administered 
(informal) plans in 1935 had already switched to (formal) annuity plans 
by 1939, yet no firms had made the reverse transition. In addition, 34% 
of  operating  group  annuity  plans  had  been  changed  from  the  older 
employer-paid form to joint  contributions (nonrevocable), and only one 
company had made the reverse change (NICB 1939, pp. 25-26).  The 
Amended Social Security Act of  1939 apparently reinforced  this trend, 
as employers who were revising pension practices opted for the modern 
insured form (see table 1). 
The figure for agricultural implements was not published separately. The change in 
stone, clay, and glass  probably  represents  a  substantial change  in  glass, which  is 
highly skilled, and less of  a change in stone and clay, which are not. American Journal of  Sociology 
In sum, the passage of  Social Security legislation had an unexpected 
positive effect on the prevalence of  private pension insurance in selected 
sectors. Most firms delayed canceling private pension  insurance, high- 
wage firms installed supplementary plans, banks installed private pen- 
sions, and most firms that had pension plans replaced them with special 
supplemental plans, and, in the process, many switched from informal 
to insured pension plans. 
THE WAR YEARS 
The growth in group health and pension plans during the first half of the 
forties was astounding. Analysts have, quite naturally, pointed to effects 
of  the war to explain these increases, but, in the light of  the available 
historical  evidence  and the NICB data, current thinking  about what 
went on during the war warrants several revisions. First, the interindus- 
try data show little effect  of  turnover, labor-market  segmentation, or 
increases in the size of organizations on the growth of insurance between 
1939 and 1946. Insurance became more popular in every industry. Sec- 
ond, when it comes to public policy, the effects of  wartime tax changes 
and wage controls have probably been  overstated, yet the  1939 Social 
Security revisions had marked effects on the incidence of private pension 
programs. Third, pension and health insurance rose at a rapid rate in 
unionized sectors, but not because unions won benefits in their negotia- 
tions with employers.  Instead, public  policy,  in  the form  of  case law 
surrounding the Wagner Act, spurred employers to offer insurance unilat- 
erally to subvert unionism; at  the same time this caused unions to channel 
their energies toward winning the right to bargain over fringe benefits. 
Industrial Arguments 
Turnover.-While  the economywide labor turnover rate increased dra- 
matically during the war, from 3.2 monthly separations per 100 workers 
in September 1940 to a peak of  6.3 in September 1943, available interin- 
dustry data for the manufacturing sector in 1943 show no relationship 
with the prevalence of  fringe benefits  in  1946.  The Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics reported turnover rates for nine separate industries in 1943, at 
the peak of  labor turnover, and the industries that had the highest turn- 
over levels-shipbuilding,  glass,  cotton textiles,  and clothing-showed 
average or below average levels of  pension  and health insurance in the 
NICB's  1946  study (the low  turnover industries  were  aircraft,  autos, 
metals, electrical machinery, and machinery; Bureau of  Labor Statistics 
1932-43  [1943, p.  12411). Further, if  benefits were indeed  adopted to 
prevent wartime turnover we would expect munitions firms to have been Private Social Insurance 
the leaders, yet the shipbuilding, aircraft, explosives, and converted auto- 
mobile industries reported overall pension and health insurance rates of 
37% and 77%, respectively. These rates are not substantially different 
from the aggregate figures for manufacturing, in which 38% of  all manu- 
facturing concerns offered pensions and 68% provided health insurance. 
Health insurance was slightly more prevalent there, but it had always 
been  popular in these dangerous heavy manufacturing sectors. For in- 
stance, the automobile industry had the highest incidence of health insur- 
ance even in 1935. 
The more diffuse effects of turnover throughout the economy are diffi- 
cult to gauge; however, several factors suggest that employment stabiliza- 
tion was not the principal driving force behind the adoption of  pension 
and health insurance. First, the war industries that grew the most (air- 
craft, shipbuilding, and the converted auto industry) paid well even be- 
fore the war and did not have to devise new strategies to lure workers 
(Bureau of  Economic  Analysis  1986). Second, the federal government 
exercised a variety of controls, through agencies such as the War Produc- 
tion Board and the War Labor Board, that dampened turnover. These 
boards were most vigilant in munitions (Baron et al.  1986). Finally, as 
discussed below,  the National War Labor Board (NWLB) wage freeze 
of  1942 was commonly circumvented, which meant that employers did 
not have to turn to nonwage forms of  remuneration to attract workers. 
Labor-market segmentation.-Widespread  increases in fringe benefits 
appeared across all industrial sectors, which contradicts the notion that 
modern labor-market bifurcation had its roots in part in the divergence 
of  benefit plans during this period. No matter how we categorize primary 
labor-market industries, they do not differ substantially from other man- 
ufacturing industries. In the aggregate, 38% of  all manufacturing firms 
reported providing group pensions, and 68% offered health insurance in 
1946. Core firms reported 39% and 70%, respectively; capital-intensive 
firms likewise reported 39% and 70%; and durable goods firms reported 
36% and 69%.9 While the large average firm size in the NICB studies 
may mean that the data represent core firms even in peripheral industries, 
other analyses of the NICB data have found marked sectoral differences 
in labor practices as predicted by labor segmentation theorists (Baron et 
al.  1986, 1988). 
Organizational scale.-The  number of employees in a firm appears to 
' Core industries are aircraft, autos, chemicals, electrical goods, machinery, metals, 
and rubber (Hodson 1978; Gordon et al. 1982). Those with high capital-output ratios 
are lumber, chemicals, glass, metals, paper, petroleum, and printing (Kuznets 1961, 
pp. 214-15;  Bureau of the Census 1947, p. 159). Durable goods industries are automo- 
biles, aircraft, electrical manufacturing, building materials, machines, metals, stone, 
clay, and glass (Bureau of  Economic Analysis 1986). American Journal of  Sociology 
be an excellent predictor of  pension and health insurance coverage, a fact 
that supports the organizational maxim that increased scale is associated 
with  increased  formalization  (Pugh et al.  1969; Blau  and Schoenherr 
197 1). Turning again to table 1, insured group pensions were nearly twice 
as prevalent in large firms as they were in small firms in 1946 (47.5% vs. 
24.8961,  and health insurance for large firms was  14 percentage points 
higher than it was for firms with fewer than 250 people.  Yet the data 
contradict the idea that firms formalize certain practices once they reach 
a specific size and the corollary that aggregate increases in formalization 
over time are the direct result of  increases in average firm size. In 1946, 
the percentages of small firms reporting pension (24%) and health (53%) 
coverage were greater than the percentages of  large firms reporting that 
coverage in 1939 (16% and 38%, respectively). This suggests that histori- 
cal factors are more important than size alone, even if large size increases 
the likelihood that an organization  will  adopt certain  institutionalized 
practices. 
Public Policy Arguments 
Interindustry evidence suggests that wartime industrial problems do not 
account for increases in the prevalence of  fringe benefits.  How did the 
wartime wage freeze and tax code changes affect the incidence of  private 
pension  and health  insurance? I will argue that policies  that were in- 
tended to popularize insurance did not have that effect, and that policies 
that were not expected to popularize insurance did. 
The NWLB wage freeze.-Analysts  of  fringe benefits have frequently 
argued that the wartime wage freeze and changes in tax policy stimulated 
private benefit  expansion  (Munts 1967; Macaulay  1959; Stevens  1988). 
The outbreak of  war in Europe quickened the American economy, in- 
creasing the bargaining power of  unions and expanding labor conflict. 
Roosevelt responded  by establishing the National War Labor Board in 
January 1942, the month following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 
The board's  most  momentous  decision  came that year  in  the  "Little 
Steel"  wage  increase case.  Bethlehem, Republic,  Inland, and Youngs- 
town  steelworkers  were  demanding raises,  but  steel  industry  leaders 
wanted to stabilize wages and Roosevelt was seeking an economywide 
wage-price freeze. The NWLB decision was a compromise that tied wage 
increases to inflation, thereby freezing real wages, and the decision served 
as a precedent for firms throughout the economy (Seidman 1953; Civilian 
Production Administration 1947; Kerry 1980; Bureau of  Labor Statistics 
1932-43  [1940-431).  In 1943, the board ruled that pension and insurance 
benefits  were not subject to  the freeze.  It is widely believed  that this Private Social Insurance 
exemption spurred firms to increase benefits in lieu of  increasing wages 
to attract and retain workers. 
The Revenue Act of  1942.-The  war brought a new tax code, designed 
in part to prevent war profiteering, which taxed up to 90% of  any profits 
that exceeded prewar levels. This gave corporations a strong incentive 
to lower their taxable income. One effect of  the law was to encourage 
new capital investment, but a number of  analysts suggest that the excess- 
profits tax also created a compelling reason to expand tax-exempt fringe 
benefits. Because wage increases were limited by the NWLB freeze, em- 
ployers  could increase  their deductible  expenditures for  labor only  by 
expanding fringe benefits such as pension  plans. Moreover, in 1943 the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) extended the tax-exempt status to pay- 
ments  for  health  insurance,  which  gave  employers another  vehicle  to 
reduce pretax profits (Macaulay 1959). Stevens (1988) suggests that the 
wage freeze and the 1942 Revenue Act thus combined to help popularize 
fringe benefits. The result was a fivefold increase in employer contribu- 
tions to pension trusts, from $171 million in 1941 to $857 million in 1945 
(see also Munts 1967; Macaulay  1959; Ilse  1953; Quadagno  1988). For 
both  workers seeking increased  remuneration and employers trying to 
compete for personnel in an increasingly tight labor market, fringe bene- 
fits now offered an avenue for circumventing the wage freeze. 
The record suggests that these policies came too late in the war to have 
caused the rises  in  pension  and health insurance  that we see between 
1939 and 1946 (Stevens  1990). The Revenue Act of  1942  did not take 
effect until  1943; the NWLB did not begin to exempt benefits from the 
wage freeze until  1943; and the IRS extension of  its pension-exemption 
policy  to health insurance only took effect in  1944. While  direct U.S. 
participation in the war effectively began in 1942, industry began gearing 
up for the war in 1939, and by 1943 employers had already made adjust- 
ments to  retain  workers.  Indeed  between  1939 and 1943, when  new 
federal policies  first took effect,  employment rose  by 49%; it increased 
only another 4 percentage points to the wartime peak in 1944 (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 1986, p. 275). Annual data on.the number of insured 
American  employees show conclusively  that the bulk of  the increases 
occurred before federal policy changes first took effect in 1943. The num- 
ber of  employees carrying group pension insurance rose from 720,000 in 
1939 to  1.2 million  in  1943 and to  1.47 million  in  1946 (Ilse 1953, p. 
315). The number carrying group healthlaccident insurance rose from 3.5 
million in 1939 to 6.5 million in 1943 and to 7 million in 1946 (Ilse 1953, 
p. 189).1° 
lo The figures for 1946 may be slightly deflated relative to those for 1943 because Ilse's 
source changed in 1945. As a result, between  1944 and 1945, Ilse's figures show a 4% American Journal of  Sociology 
Moreover the wage freeze probably had little effect even in the last 
two years of  the war because firms found ways to circumvent it. Because 
raises  were allowed  in  conjunction  with promotions,  as early as  1943 
three out of  five firms were paying wage increases for "in-grade progres- 
sion," or promotions  to progressively  higher job  titles within  the same 
job-a  practice that, because it discouraged turnover, was permitted by 
the NWLB (Jacoby  1985, p. 264). The wage freeze, then, did not prevent 
employers from raising wages when they wanted to. This practice ap- 
pears  to  undermine  the wage  freezeltax increase argument because it 
enabled firms to retain valued workers and at the same time decrease 
before-tax profits without installing fringe benefits. 
Analysts have reasonably assumed that these policy changes had the 
effects  their  authors intended.  By  exempting  fringe benefits  from  the 
wage freeze Roosevelt's NWLB hoped to encourage the adoption of  in- 
surance  coverage.  The  administration  had  expected  that  the  tax-
deductible  status it extended to  health  insurance would  foster fringe- 
benefit  programs.  The architects  of  the  1942 Revenue Act included  a 
clause requiring that tax-exempt pension programs cover 70% of employ- 
ees and prohibiting discrimination against low-wage employees in order 
to  encourage  firms to  expand private pension  coverage."  While  these 
policies probably did encourage firms to install insurance programs, they 
came too  late to  have caused  the massive wartime increases in fringe 
benefits. 
The Amended Social Security Act of  1939 and Business Strategy 
The 1939 amendments to Social Security appear to have had an unin- 
tended positive effect  on  private  pension  programs that has not been 
documented  in  the recent  literature.  The act as amended encouraged 
employers to favor private insurance plans for several reasons. On the 
one hand, the 1939 amendments made it clear to employers who were 
awaiting  Roosevelt's  promised  benefit  increases  that  those  increases 
would not be soon forthcoming.  Employers felt compelled to adopt sup- 
plementary pension plans for highly paid employees. On the other hand, 
Social Security provided a foundation retirement wage, which made pri- 
vate pensions relatively cheap. Employers could now try to win the hearts 
of  workers through pension programs without spending much money. 
Roosevelt had hopes for an incremental expansion of  Social Security 
decline in pension  coverage and a 9% decline in health coverage. But this has little 
effect on the overall picture. 

"  As Louise Ilse (1953) points out, programs that covered only employees who earned 

over $3,000 were not considered discriminatory. 
Private Social Insurance 
after 1935, and the intent of the 1939 legislation was to liberalize coverage 
(Achenbaum 1986, p. 26). Thereafter benefits would be calculated on the 
basis  of  average income at the time of  retirement rather than on total 
lifetime contributions; this was expected to increase pension income be- 
cause employees typically  reach  peak  earnings just  before  retirement. 
The 1939 law called for employees to be fully insured with as little as 
two years of  participation in the plan, rather than 40 years, and the first 
benefits became payable in January  1940, rather than in January  1942 
(Achenbaum 1986, p. 30). The amendments also called for benefits, but 
not contributions, to increase with each dependent and for dependent 
payments to continue after the death of  the insured employee. 
But federal  pension  insurance was a  zero-sum  game because  fiscal 
conservatives in Congress refused to increase total expenditures. Liberal- 
izing entitlements meant that projected benefits per recipient would not 
rise significantly (Achenbaum 1986, p. 34). The 1939 act also postponed 
a scheduled increase in contributions that might have permitted benefits 
to rise with inflation. While the 1939 legislation called for a slight increase 
in projected benefits, it would be over a decade before Congress approved 
new increases. 
Had benefits been set at a fixed percentage of  income, inflation would 
have had no effect in real dollars. Instead, the benefit structure caused 
projected payments to retirees to decline dramatically in real terms be- 
tween 1939 and 1946 as average wages doubled. First, the plan covered 
only the first $3,000 of income. For a person who earned $3,000 in 1939 
and whose income doubled by  1946, the maximum monthly benefit  of 
$56 declined from 22  % to  11% of  working income. A growing number 
of  Americans crossed  the $3,000 threshold  between  1935 and 1946, as 
that figure declined from 2.6 to 1.26 times the average full-time income. 
Second, those who earned less than $3,000 also lost in terms of  projected 
benefits because the reverse-graduated plan dictated that benefits would 
decline, as a percentage of income, as income increased (NICB 1939, p. 
41; Bureau of  Economic Analysis  1986, p.  279). By failing to increase 
benefits in 1939 to counteract the effects of  inflation, and by delaying an 
increase in  contributions, Congress demonstrated that public coverage 
would not provide an adequate retirement wage. 
Contemporary publications predicted a substantial increase in private 
plans  in  response  to  the  1939 amendments,  and the  data show such 
an increase (NICB 1939; 1940b). First, there is a remarkable aggregate 
increase; table 1 shows that between 1939 and 1946 the incidence of firms 
offering pensions rose from 7%  to 38% in manufacturing and from 31% 
to 67% in nonmanufacturing.  Second, data presented in table 3 suggest 
that there were large  increases in supplemental pension  plans for the 
managerial employees for whom Social Security benefits would replace American Journal of  Sociology 
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only  a  small proportion of  working income.  By  1946 firms were  50% 
more likely to offer pensions to salaried workers than to wage earners. 
Nearly a  third  of  nonmanufacturing  firms, where lower-level  workers 
were frequently salaried, had installed special pension plans for employ- 
ees whose earnings exceeded the $3,000 Social Security ceiling-this  was 
also true for 14% of  manufacturing firms. 
Finally, because federal policy did not require firms to bargain with 
unions over fringe benefits, employers tried to use benefits to discourage 
unionism.  Industrial relations professionals  were promoting private in- 
surance as an antiunion device with the same rhetoric that had been used 
to sell welfare work. However, after unions won the right to bargain for 
benefits in the late forties, employers switched to support for Social Secu- 
rity increases, and they helped to win expanded Social Security benefits 
in the early fifties (Stevens 1990). 
Public Policy and Union Support for Fringe Benefits 
A  number  of  analysts have argued  that union  agitation  for  coverage 
accounts for the remarkable increases in health and pension  insurance 
during the war. Unfortunately,  the NICB's studies do not present de- 
tailed data on the coverage of  union  workers, although there  is  some 
evidence that unionization  was related  to  the presence  of  pension  and 
health insurance (see tables  1 and 3). First, if  we look cross-sectionally 
at 1935 we see that nonmanufacturing industries were more highly union- 
ized (25  % of  all firms were unionized) than were manufacturing industries 
(10% of  all firms were  unionized), and they were more likely to offer 
pension insurance (31% vs.  7%).  Figures for health insurance were simi- 
lar across the two sectors, despite the fact that many nonmanufacturing 
firms still depended on mutual benefit associations or salary maintenance. 
Second, increases over time in unionization are related to the number of Private Social Insurance 
TABLE 4 
PERCENTAGE  UNION  CONTRACTS,  AND SIZE OF FIRMS  REPORTING  BY SECTOR 
1928  1935  1939  1946 
Manufacturing  .............  4.7  9.6  43.0  80.2 

Nonmanufacturing  ........  3.8  25.0  45.3  59.5 

Small firms  ..................  4.7  7.3  32.3  67.8 

Large firms  .......,..........  5.5  13.9  48.6  80.5 

All industrieslfirms  ........  4.9  11.7  43.4  77.3 

NoTE.-T~~1928 sectoral figures are for small firms and the 1928 figure for all industries contains 
a higher  proportion of  small firms.  Small firms are those with fewer than  250 employees; large firms 
have 250 or more employees. 
employers who offer insurance. Between 1935 and 1946 unionization rose 
from 10% to 80% among surveyed manufacturing firms, and it rose from 
25%  to only 60% in nonmanufacturing  (see table 4). Over that period 
both types of insurance underwent huge gains in manufacturing, but only 
pension insurance increased in nonmanufacturing areas (see table 1). 
Unionization increased substantially in the aggregate over these years, 
and unions fought hard to win employment-related  insurance  even as 
they fought for the expansion of  Social Security. Contemporary events 
suggest that public policy channeled union energies in the direction of 
private coverage. First, case law surrounding the Wagner Act entangled 
unions in a battle over the right to bargain for insurance coverage. The 
Wagner Act required firms to bargain with unions on the "wages  and 
conditions of  employment"  without specifying whether "conditions"  in- 
cluded benefits.  Employers contended that "conditions"  did not include 
benefits, and the courts backed them up until after the war, spurring a 
battle in the courtroom and at the workplace (Munts 1967, p. 10; Bern- 
stein 1972). Unions, particularly the new Congress of  Industrial Organi- 
zations (CIO) unions in the mass-production  sector, fought the fringe- 
benefit  battle  in  the courts by demanding the legal  right  to  represent 
members in negotiations for benefits and, at the organizational level, by 
demanding that employers include benefits in union contracts (Bernstein 
1972; Quadagno 1988). Labor historians (e.g., Bernstein  1972) seem to 
concur that if  the Wagner Act had not made benefits  a  point  of  con- 
tention,  unions  might  have  spent  more  of  their  energies  backing the 
expansion of  Social Security. 
The sharp rise in insurance between 1939 and 1946, therefore, cannot 
be attributed to union-negotiated benefit plans.''  Only 4% of large firms 
l2 By  1947  an estimated  1.5 million  Americans  were  covered by union-negotiated 
health plans, some 90% of which were in the mining industry (which had experienced American Journal of  Sociology 
in the 1946 survey had union contracts which included any sort of insur- 
ance scheme, while 81% were unionized and 67% offered health insur- 
ance (NICB 1947). However there is strong evidence that firms frequently 
adopted fringe benefits  either to subvert union organizing efforts or to 
appease unions, and, in fact, a number of  unions won contractual prom- 
ises that employers would not discontinue their unilateral  benefit plans 
(Bernstein 1972; Munts 1967, p. 49). 
Second, the form group pension insurance took after passage of Social 
Security  legislation  also  contributed  to  union  lobbying  for  expanded 
employment-related coverage. The 1939 amendments made it clear that 
even  if  some Democrats envisioned  Social  Security as a  full-coverage 
pension program, in practice it served as a safety net that was inadequate 
without supplementary coverage. By 1939 most firms had adopted some 
sort of graduated private pension program that would make up the differ- 
ence between Social Security benefits and a certain percentage of  prere- 
tirement income (NICB 1939). 
These programs were marketed by insurance companies, who devised 
"integrated"  pension  plans  that guaranteed a  certain combined public- 
private retirement wage in the hope that promised increases  in public 
benefit levels would decrease projected insurance industry expenditures 
(Achenbaum 1986, p. 46). The structure of Social Security legislation and 
the projections  for future benefit  increases thus  shaped the insurance 
industry strategy.  The nature  of  these plans  in  turn influenced  union 
strategy, because  they  had the  effect  of  nullifying  Social  Security in- 
creases.  For each  dollar increase  in  monthly Social Security benefits, 
private supplemental benefits would decrease by a dollar. The 1942 Reve- 
nue Act then sanctioned this form of  supplemental coverage by making 
it tax exempt, while it rendered other discriminatory pension  programs 
taxable. These formulas encouraged the rank and file to fight for increases 
in the total benefit levels guaranteed by their private pension  programs 
because  they  would  gain  nothing  from  Social  Security increases  (see 
Quadagno 1988). Thus the structure of  Social Security benefits led unions 
to promote private fringe-benefit programs at the organizational level. 
Union support for private pension  insurance had in part been stimu- 
lated by congressional resistance to the idea of  expanding Social Security. 
Likewise  union  support for  employment-related  health  insurance was 
reinforced by the failure of  a series of  public health insurance bills  in 
Congress.  Early proponents of  Social  Security wanted health coverage 
strikes and a federal takeover during the war) and the textileiclothing industry (where 
industrywide jointly  managed funds were established in  1942 contracts; Goldmann 
1948, p. 47; Munts 1967, pp. 13-28).  Those successes are evident in table 1. Private Social Insurance 
included in the 1935 legislation, but acquiesced to fiscal conservatives in 
Congress. In 1939 Senator Robert Wagner introduced a bill that would 
have provided governmental health coverage for the needy, but that bill 
never came to a vote. In 1943 the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill proposed 
universal and comprehensive health coverage to be administered under 
Social Security, but strong opposition from the American Medical Associ- 
ation (AMA) doomed it. In 1944 Roosevelt promoted an "economic bill 
of rights," which included the right to adequate medical care, and shortly 
after the end of  the war Truman asked for national health insurance to 
cover all Americans, but the AMA defeated that bill as well (Anderson 
1985; Berkowitz and McQuaid 1980; Starr 1982). Each defeat bolstered 
union support for private health coverage. 
In sum, unions might have been expected to throw all of  their support 
behind social insurance in the forties, but the Wagner Act and congres- 
sional opposition to the growth of  Social Security kept them fighting for 
fringe benefits as well. When unions won the right to bargain over bene- 
fits in the  1947 Inland  Steel  decision, they did not  give  up on fringe 
benefits; on the contrary, having just lost ground in the Taft-Hartley Act, 
unions were anxious to demonstrate their newfound powers by winning 
fringe-benefit increases. 
Alternative  union  strategies.-Historical  factors  produced  unusual 
union strategies in certain sectors. These strategies led to substantially 
different kinds of  benefit  systems. An examination of  several examples 
suggests that had public policy created a different set of  incentives for 
unions in all industries, the outcome might have been  a very different 
system of  pension  and health coverage throughout the economy. 
First,  AFL and CIO unions  pursued  markedly  different  strategies 
when it came to health benefits. The skilled AFL unions had traditionally 
sought to maximize their control over such matters as hiring and appren- 
ticeships, and many AFL leaders still preferred to control member bene- 
fits directly through their own pension schemes and mutual benefit associ- 
ations (Brandes 1976; Quadagno 1988, p. 160). By contrast the industrial 
CIO unions generally sought to formalize employment rights, and they 
backed employer-provided insurance schemes with nonrevokable  rights 
to benefits.  Consequently, mutual benefit associations survived in AFL- 
dominated industries, and health insurance prevailed in CIO-dominated 
industries.  Those relationships became stronger during the war, despite 
the overall decline in welfare programs and the rise of  insurance. Note 
that AFL unionism correlates .24 with mutual benefit association usage 
in 1935 (before the establishment of  the CIO), .33 (P < .lo)  in 1939, and 
.40 (P < .05) in 1946 (see table 5). By contrast, CIO unionism correlates 
.29 with health insurance coverage in 1939, and .61 (P < .01) in  1946, American Journal of  Sociology 
TABLE 5 
CORRELATIONS  WITH  HEALTH  COVERAGE  OF AFL AND CIO UNIONISM 
1935  1939  1946 
Unionism  AFL  CIO  AFL  CIO 
Mutual benefit association  . . ... . . . 











NoTE.-T~~ CIO did not exist in 1935. 
tP<  .lo. 
* P < .05. 
** P < .Ol. 
at which time it also correlates .38 (P < .05) with hospitalization insur- 
ance.13 Here the different strategies of  AFL and CIO unions had clear 
effects on fringe-benefit development, even if  unions did not yet receive 
contractual rights to negotiate for health insurance. 
Second, the railway industry shows evidence of  what American pen- 
sion  and health  coverage  might have looked  like had unions in more 
industries pursued the strategy of  providing insurance themselves. Evi- 
dence from railroads and mining suggests that union-sponsored benefits 
precluded the adoption of  employer-provided insurance. Railway unions 
had first been  organized as benevolent societies and had long provided 
death,  sickness,  and old-age  benefits  for  members.  By  1931, railway 
unions paid out more in sickness benefits and in old-age pensions than did 
unions in any other industry-half  as much as all other unions combined 
(Bureau of  Labor Statistics  1933, pp. 313-31).  Union health  coverage 
provided  an alternative to company benefits,  hence table 1 shows that 
among  transportation/communication  firms,  company  pensions  and 
health insurance declined between  1935 and 1939. By 1946 transporta- 
tion  reported the lowest incidence of  offering  health insurance of  any 
industry, with the exception of  banking, where salary maintenance pro- 
grams were still used  as a  substitute. In contrast, mining unions  had 
provided death benefits, but seldom offered pension or sickness coverage, 
and table  1 indicates that pension  and health insurance had expanded 
significantly for miners by 1946. The success of union-provided insurance 
among railways suggests that if  unions  in other sectors  had installed 
l3 Correlations use  the original  industrial categories from the NICB reports. Note 
that only industry-level  data were available, hence these correlations represent  the 
relationships between unionism and benefits among industries, not firms. In order to 
maximize the number of  cases in each panel (26 in 1935, 25 in 1939, and 32 in 1946) 
I have not regrouped the industries to make them comparable over time. Private Social Insurance 
insurance schemes before corporations did so, as Samuel Gompers advo- 
cated, union-provided insurance schemes might have proliferated during 
the war and become the norm in American industry. 
CONCLUSION 
Industrial Arguments 
Data collected by the NICB largely contradict the received wisdom that 
industrial factors and wartime public policies  stimulated the growth of 
fringe-benefit  programs.  Early interindustry differences  suggested  that 
firms with skilled workers were most likely to adopt fringe-benefit pack- 
ages and that organizational scale was associated with an industry's offer- 
ing fringe benefits.  Yet the experiences of  the thirties tend to discount 
industrial arguments, because despite the fact that the problems normally 
associated  with  unionism-labor  turnover,  organizational  scale,  and 
labor-market segmentation-were  mitigated  during this period  of  eco- 
nomic crisis,  the incidence of  pension  and health insurance  increased. 
Furthermore, interindustry data from the forties suggest that these indus- 
trial problems were not related to increases in the prevalence of  fringe 
benefits. 
Institutional Theory and Interest Group Goals 
I have developed an alternative institutional explanation that links public 
policy  to  interest group goals and in  turn to organizational  outcomes. 
The findings presented  here  underscore  the power  of  an institutional 
approach  that treats interest group goals  as an intermediate variable 
between  environmental  context  and organizational  outcomes.  As  ex-
pected, union and business groups did not pursue consistent, predictable 
goals in the realms of  health and pension coverage; rather, public policy 
shifts  caused  union  and business  goals  to  vary  over  time,  and those 
groups were clearly instrumental in popularizing private insurance. Pre- 
vious  organizational  studies have provided  important evidence of  the 
effects of the policy environment on group goals and organizational out- 
comes (Fligstein 1990; Baron et al. 1986), and here I have tried to extend 
that perspective by looking at the effects of  public policy on the shifting 
goals of  all major groups. In addition to providing a contextual frame- 
work for understanding group interests, this approach highlights the im- 
portance of recognizing that a group may pursue a single end alternately 
at the organizational level and at the political level. 
The broad institutional context of American industrial and state devel- 
opment clearly contributed to union and business preferences for private American Journal of  Sociology 
forms of  coverage. America's early industrial development led to the rise 
of  sophisticated  corporate bureaucracies;  however, the development of 
the federal bureaucracy was comparatively slow (Chandler 1990; Skow- 
ronek  1982). As  a  result  firms and unions  experimented  with  private 
insurance long before  Washington considered getting into the act, and 
when these groups discovered labor control functions in private coverage 
they became reluctant to relinquish control to the state. In Philip Selz- 
nick's (1948) terms, these practices had developed organizational constit- 
uencies that would fight for them in the future. This set the groundwork 
for the situation in the teens and twenties, when both business and labor 
leaders advocated private forms of  insurance. Weak public protections 
had also stimulated the development of  a large and sophisticated insur- 
ance industry that would promote employment-related health and pen- 
sion coverage during the economic downturn of  the thirties. 
The strength and consistency  of  union support for private insurance 
is particularly surprising. Before the early thirties,  the AFL leadership 
supported union-provided coverage instead of  public coverage, because 
they believed that coverage increased member loyalty. After 1935 unions 
fought  for  employer-provided  insurance  because  public  policy  made 
union bargaining rights a point of contention. Finally, during the forties 
the  popularity  of  federally  approved supplemental pension  insurance 
plans bolstered  union support for the expansion of  private benefits be- 
cause the supplemental plans canceled out increases in public coverage. 
Intended and Unintended Consequences of  Public Policy 
Public policies  that were expected to increase the incidence  of  private 
insurance did not always succeed. There were, however, some policies 
that did achieve this end without being designed to do so. Wartime tax 
and wage  policies  were  certainly  intended  to  help  diffuse  employer- 
provided insurance, but by tracing the empirical effects of  those policies 
I have shown that they appeared after the wartime rise in fringe benefits. 
Instead, Social Security legislation boosted employment-related pension 
insurance by institutionalizing retirement without providing an adequate 
retirement wage. The original Social Security Act of  1935 had a marked 
effect  on the prevalence  of  private pensions in  high-wage sectors  and 
also  caused  firms to  rewrite their  pension  plans.  Moreover, the  1939 
amendments to the act gave  a  substantial boost  to  private insurance 
schemes because they expanded eligibility without raising contributions. 
Social Security revenues could not support the benefit increases that Roo- 
sevelt had originally hoped for, and when benefits were decimated by 
inflation,  corporations  responded  by  installing  private  supplementary 
pension programs. The failure of  several proposals to extend Social Secu- Private Social Insurance 
rity to include health insurance had a similar effect on private health1 
accident coverage. 
The demise of  welfare programs was in part wrought by these same 
policies, not by the economic  exigencies of  the Depression  era. Health 
and pension forms of  welfare work rose during the early Depression. But 
these forms declined after  1935 as firms  responded  to Social Security 
legislation by replacing their antiquated informal pension programs with 
modern  supplementary insurance. Both forms of  welfare coverage fell 
prey to the struggle over the interpretation of  the Wagner Act, which led 
firms  to  offer  insured fringe  benefits  outside  of  the  union  bargaining 
process. 
Finally, while this article has focused on the factors that contributed 
to the growth of  private employment-related insurance, the perspective 
employed here can inform institutional studies of state policy formulation 
as well.  It should be  clear, for instance, that the factors that shaped 
labor, business, and insurance industry goals vis-8-vis  firm-level insur- 
ance coverage also shaped their goals vis-&-vis social insurance legisla- 
tion, and the events of  the forties clearly set the course for the future of 
social insurance (Amenta and Skocpol  1988). While  some institutional 
studies of  politics have analyzed how institutional factors affect the ca- 
pacities  of  different  groups to  prevail  in political  struggles (Weir and 
Skocpol  1983), institutionalists  have largely  ignored  how  institutional 
context shapes the goals groups pursue in the first place. 
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